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FOREWORD 
I am very pleased to introduce this report Hidden versus Revealed Attitudes: A List 
Experiment on Support for Minorities in Ireland. The Irish Human Rights and Equality 
Commission is statutorily mandated to encourage good practice in intercultural relations, to 
promote tolerance and acceptance of diversity in the State and respect for the freedom and 
dignity of each person.  
The publication of this report comes at a moment when the relationship between individual 
attitudes and systemic racism has been cast into sharp focus. One of the ways we can 
uncover, challenge, and change subtle, endemic racism is by being more confident that the 
mirror we hold up to Irish society – for example, through research which measures attitudes 
towards minority groups – offers a clear reflection back to us.  
However measuring attitudes on sensitive topics – such as attitudes towards minority 
groups – can prove difficult. Social desirability bias is the theory that what people say in 
public is driven by social pressure to respond in a particular way, resulting in over-reporting 
or under-reporting particular attitudes. Accordingly, people may hide their true opinion in 
survey interviews.  
This report presents the findings from the first list experiment conducted in Ireland. This 
innovative method identifies the effects of social desirability bias. This gives us a more 
accurate understanding of social attitudes towards different groups and how these may vary 
in the wider population. A better understanding of the relationship between hidden and 
revealed attitudes can inform the Commission’s work to deliver meaningful change in public 
discourse, behaviours and experiences. 
This is the seventh in a series of research reports prepared by the ESRI for the Irish Human 
Rights and Equality Commission. The aim of the IHREC-ESRI Human Rights and Equality 
Research Programme is to create, improve and enhance knowledge in order to provide 
evidence for monitoring and for the development of policy.  
I would like to thank the ESRI for their continued engagement. In particular, I would like to 
extend my appreciation to the report’s authors, Professor Frances McGinnity, Professor 
Mathew Creighton and Éamonn Fahey, for their work on this important subject.  
 
Salome Mbugua 
Acting Chief Commissioner  
Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Survey data can provide important insights on attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic and 
religious minorities. However, there is often a concern that people hide their negative views 
towards these groups in surveys and give ‘socially desirable’ responses. This report 
addresses that possible source of bias using an innovative research design called a ‘list 
experiment’, which offers respondents an anonymous way to express any negative attitudes 
they may have. It thus complements other research on attitudes to minorities in Ireland 
(McGinnity et al., 2018a), as well as more general research on equality and discrimination 
(McGinnity et al., 2018c). This report explores the use of a survey experiment, termed the 
list experiment, to identify and understand the extent to which negative attitudes towards 
two specific groups are concealed. The results suggest that the method could be easily 
extended to explore attitudes to other minority groups in contemporary Ireland. 
The list experiment presents the ‘treatment’ group of respondents a list of items, including 
one sensitive item, and asks how many items they agree with. Crucially, they are not asked 
which of the items they agree with, just how many. A ‘control’ group is given the same list of 
items, minus the sensitive item that asks about support for the controversial topic – in this 
case more Muslim (or Black) people coming to Ireland. As the groups are randomly assigned 
and both samples are presented the same control list items, any difference between the 
average response to the control and treatment is due to the additional (sensitive) item. 
Respondents in the control group are also asked a direct question about support for more 
Muslim (or Black) people coming to Ireland. The difference between revealed support from 
the direct survey question and support from the list is interpretable as a measure of the 
extent to which support for immigration is over-stated or negative attitudes are hidden or 
‘masked’. 
We use the first list experiment carried out in Ireland in two waves of the Economic 
Sentiment Monitor to investigate revealed and hidden attitudes to for more Black and 
Muslim people coming to live in Ireland. The survey captured attitudes of two nationally 
representative samples of adults in Ireland – approximately 1,600 individuals in total – in 
June and July 2017. 
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KEY FINDINGS 
The key finding of this report is that the masking of negative views varies by both the group 
in question (Black and Muslim people) and the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
respondent. The questions focus on immigration, that is more people from each group 
coming to Ireland, but we argue they are reflective of the context for these minority groups 
living in Ireland. 
Hidden and revealed attitudes to different groups  
We find that when survey respondents are asked about their views directly, they are more 
likely to express support for more Black people coming to Ireland than for more Muslim 
people. However, we also find that social pressures to exhibit tolerance are much greater 
when people are asked about the Black ethnic group than the Muslim group. Fifteen per 
cent of the sample do not support more Black people coming to Ireland but conceal this 
when asked directly in the survey. By contrast, we found no such masking of lack of support 
for the Muslim group. This is consistent with international evidence which shows that 
Muslims are often not subject to masking to the same extent that other groups are 
(Creighton and Jamal, 2015; Creighton et al., 2016; Benzeval et al., 2017). When 
respondents in Ireland are given anonymity in the list experiment, they are no more 
supportive of the Black ethnic group than the Muslim group: about half of the population 
support more of each minority group coming to Ireland.  
At around 50 per cent, the levels of anonymously expressed support in Ireland are higher 
than those emerging from a similar series of experiments in the UK in 2015 and 2016. 
Between 30 and 36 per cent of UK respondents support Muslim immigration, and between 
30 and 42 per cent anonymously express support for Black immigration in the UK, albeit that 
these questions are focused specifically on immigration by Black people from the Caribbean. 
Note also, given the design of the survey in the Irish list experiment, there is no option to 
express ‘neutral’ opinions about more Black and Muslim people coming to Ireland: there 
could be some people who have no opinion on the topic or ‘don’t mind’. Instead, the 
approach measures differences in the level of support expressed and masked by 
respondents.  
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Masking varies by education 
Survey data have consistently shown that people with higher educational attainment are 
more positive towards minorities in Ireland and elsewhere. However, this report reveals 
that this is largely because highly educated people tend to conceal their negative attitudes 
in surveys. We find that among people with third-level education, over one-quarter conceal 
negative attitudes to the Black ethnic group, and one-fifth mask negativity towards Muslims. 
By contrast, only 8.5 per cent of people whose highest educational attainment is the Leaving 
Certificate or less conceal lack of support for the Black ethnic group, and we find no 
evidence of masking among this group when they are asked about more Muslim people 
coming to Ireland. When we consider anonymously expressed attitudes, there is no 
statistically significant difference between those with higher education (third-level) and 
those with only Leaving Certificate qualifications (or less) in support for either the Black or 
Muslim groups. This is an important finding because people with decision-making power 
over public policy and the allocation of resources such as jobs and housing tend to have 
higher educational attainment.  
Masking varies by age 
While the effect of age on attitudes reported in previous literature is not usually as robust 
as that of education, we would generally expect younger people to express more positive 
views to minority groups than older people. Indeed, this is supported by our estimates of 
openly expressed support for both groups using the direct question. However, the 
differences between the age groups are substantially smaller when we look at anonymously 
expressed attitudes derived from the list. This is because masking is almost twice as 
prevalent among the younger group (aged 18-49) as among the older group (aged 50 or 
over) with respect to the question on Black immigration. However, even after this 
adjustment, those aged less than 50 are still much more likely to support more Black people 
coming to Ireland (just under 60 per cent support this) than those aged 50 or over (40 per 
cent support this). We find no evidence of masking among those 50 and over who are asked 
about the Muslim group, but over ten per cent of those under 50 mask on this item. There 
are no age differences in anonymously expressed support for Muslims coming to Ireland – 
just over half of each age group support this – though note these are relatively wide age 
brackets.  
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Masking varies by gender, but this depends on the minority group  
Twenty-one per cent of men mask negative opinions towards the Black ethnic group 
compared to 10 per cent of women. While men seem more supportive when asked directly, 
the lists reveal no gender difference in anonymously expressed attitudes towards the Black 
ethnic group. Women, by contrast, mask negativity towards Muslims to a much greater 
extent. Over one-fifth of women hold but conceal lack of support for the Muslim group in 
the survey. While there is no difference between men and women in terms of attitudes 
towards Muslims when measured directly, a large and statistically significant gender 
difference appears on anonymously expressed scores, with women being much less in 
favour of more Muslims coming to Ireland (40 per cent support this) than men (67 per cent 
support this).  
IMPLICATIONS 
These findings challenge results from standard surveys. It appears that the prevalence of 
positive attitudes towards some minority groups may be heavily influenced by social 
desirability – in other words, by people hiding their true opinions in survey interviews. The 
extent of social desirability bias disrupts the presumption that Irish attitudes to these 
minorities are as positive as they seem on the face of it. While evidence of socially desirable 
response patterns has been documented in other countries, this is the first time this has 
been attempted in Ireland. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that social pressure to conceal negative attitudes may 
affect some groups of respondents more than others. This prompts us to reassess our 
interpretation of how attitudes to immigration vary by age, gender and educational 
attainment. It also suggests that list experiments would be valuable additions to future 
social surveys in Ireland and elsewhere. 
That is not to say that analysis of standard survey data is not valuable. Attitudes which are 
openly expressed in surveys still matter because they may be better predictors of certain 
types of behaviours and outcomes than concealed opinions. For instance, we know that 
negative or toxic public discourse can impact on health and well-being outcomes among 
minority groups. This effect can be direct, or it can occur by increasing perceptions of 
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discrimination which in turn compromise mental health and well-being (Wallace et al., 2016; 
McGinnity and Gijsberts, 2016; Safi, 2010).  
However, we argue that negative attitudes which are not expressed openly may affect 
decisions made regarding minority groups behind closed doors or via anonymous acts – 
voting or recruitment being two prominent examples. While any attempt to foster 
interculturalism must consider directly expressed attitudes, efforts are also needed to 
understand and to combat more subtle, covert or coded forms of prejudice and 
discrimination. Accounting for the presence of social desirability bias found in this 
experiment can inform the development of interventions to change discriminatory attitudes 
using a more targeted, nuanced approach. Increasing the evidence base is the first step in 
that process.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Motivation and context 
1.1  WHY CONDUCT A LIST EXPERIMENT IN IRELAND?  
Rapid immigration during the economic boom in Ireland has meant that Ireland has become 
considerably more diverse in terms of ethnic and national origin in recent decades. How has 
the Irish population responded to this? Attitudinal data provide an important indicator of 
the climate towards groups like immigrants and ethnic and religious minorities. However, 
there is often a concern that people do not give true answers to sensitive survey questions 
on immigrants and ethnic and religious minorities. Instead, they may choose to conceal 
negative attitudes from the interviewer due to social pressures to come across as tolerant 
and welcoming. This phenomenon, known as ‘social desirability’, biases our estimates of the 
extent of pro- and anti-immigration sentiment, and is the subject of this analysis.  
It is important to account for social desirability for a number of reasons. First, while survey 
data generally suggest that attitudes to immigrants and minority groups in Ireland are not 
particularly negative, there could be a latent anti-minority opinion that is being concealed 
from interviewers. None of the large data gathering programmes on attitudes such as the 
European Social Survey, the European Values Study, or the Eurobarometer include a 
mechanism to account for social desirability bias. Second, previous research has found a 
large difference in attitudes to immigrants in Ireland between certain groups in the 
population, such as people with high and low educational attainment (McGinnity et al., 
2018a). If social desirability bias is higher among the highly educated, we might be 
overestimating the difference in attitudes between those with higher and lower education. 
It may be that the highly educated are not more tolerant but are just more likely to conceal 
their negative attitudes. If this is the case, education per se may not lead to more tolerance 
of diversity. Finally, we know very little from survey data about attitudes to the Black ethnic 
group in Ireland, except they are much more likely to experience discrimination (McGinnity 
et al., 2017). Fahey et al. (2019) found less directly expressed support for Muslim 
immigration than for White immigration in Ireland in 2014. Uncovering both revealed and 
hidden attitudes to both the Black and Muslim groups might be instructive in understanding 
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discrimination towards ethnic and religious minorities in Ireland and the groups’ 
experiences here.  
List experiments have been used internationally to measure directly and anonymously 
expressed attitudes to sensitive topics such as immigration policy preferences (Janus, 2010); 
attitudes towards certain immigrant groups like Muslims (Creighton and Jamal, 2015; 
Creighton and Strabac, forthcoming) and attitudes to gay marriage (Glynn, 2013).1 List 
experiments have also been used to investigate socially undesirable behaviour, such as 
shoplifting, drink driving, illicit drug use, marital infidelity and tax fraud (Krumpal, 2013).  
Moreover, work that has considered attitudes toward immigrant groups by race or religion 
has revealed significant reluctance to reveal intolerance. In work in the US on extending 
citizenship to legal Muslim and Christian immigrants, support for both immigrant groups 
was similar but deviated significantly when anonymity was provided (Creighton and Jamal, 
2015). In the Netherlands, support for Muslim immigrants is significantly lower when 
expressed via a list experiment (Creighton, forthcoming). Similarly, when considering race, 
work in the US (Bazo-Veinrich and Creighton, 2018) suggests that opposition to immigration 
and whether it is concealed varies by the ethnicity of the respondent, with Black and White 
respondents much more likely to mask opposition than Hispanic respondents. In the 
Netherlands (Creighton et. al., 2019a; 2019b), list experiments revealed that respondents 
reported significantly less support for immigrants defined as the same race as the 
respondent when measured via a list experiment. Similarly, in Norway, attitudes toward 
Muslim newcomers are often masked (Creighton and Strabac, forthcoming). 
This project uses the first list experiment conducted in Ireland. It was conducted in the 
summer of 2017, and probed respondents about their views on the Black ethnic group and 
the Muslim group. These are particularly salient minority groups. Black people report high 




1  Directly expressed attitudes refer to opinions that are openly revealed to interviewers in survey settings. 
Anonymously expressed attitudes are group-level opinions that are measured by a list experiment under 
conditions of permanent guaranteed anonymity.  
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(McGinnity et al., 2017); while debates on Muslim immigration have become very 
prominent in many European countries in recent years (Helbling, 2012). 
1.2  CONTEXT: DIVERSITY IN IRELAND  
This experiment analyses responses to questions about more Black and Muslim people 
coming to Ireland as a way of capturing attitudes to the groups more generally. Here we 
provide a description of the resident Black and Muslim populations using census data.  
Although a large proportion of recent immigration has been from other European countries, 
and most immigrants have been White, Ireland has seen increased religious and ethnic 
diversity in the past 25 years. While the CSO publishes census data on religion dating back to 
1891, Muslims were enumerated separately from the ‘other’ religion category for the first 
time in 1991, when they numbered 3,875. Figure 1.1 shows that over the period 1991-2016, 
the number of Muslim people in Ireland has increased steadily to 62,000 in 2016. Data on 
ethnic and cultural background were first collected in 2006. In this year, the census revealed 
that there were 44,318 Black people living in Ireland. The Black population also grew, but 
this increase was concentrated in the 2006-2011 intercensal period. By 2011 just over 
65,000 respondents defined their ethnicity as Black on the Census, and this number was 




2  The census ethnicity question asks: ‘What is your ethnic or cultural background?’ Responses include: White, 
Black or Black Irish, Asian or Asian Irish, Other including mixed race, Not Stated.  
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FIGURE 1.1 NUMBER OF BLACK AND MUSLIM PEOPLE LIVING IN IRELAND 
 
 
Source: CSO Statbank Tables E7016, E7057, C0507, C0501 and B1201. 
 
Just under 30 per cent of Muslims and 38 per cent of Black people were born in Ireland. 
A further 12,442 Muslims were born in Pakistan, accounting for just over 20 per cent of the 
total. Over half (53 per cent) of Black people were born in African countries and over 
one-quarter have Nigerian origins. Approximately half of each group report Irish nationality 
in the census, but both groups are very diverse in terms of country of origin (McGinnity et 
al., 2018b). 
These minority groups perform well on some indicators of integration and social inclusion, 
but poorly on others. Both groups, but in particular Black people, are highly educated. 
The 2016 Census shows that 63 per cent of Black people and 57 per cent of Muslims have 
tertiary education, compared to 48 per cent of the total population. However, this 
educational advantage does not translate to the labour market. Unemployment is more 
than twice as prevalent among both the Black and Muslim communities as in the entire 
population; and Black people are considerably under-represented among managers or 
professionals. In addition to having higher unemployment rates, both groups have 
considerably lower employment rates than the total adult population, partly because they 
are more likely to be students. These patterns can in part be explained by the age profile of 
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TABLE 1.1  CHARACTERISTICS OF BLACK AND MUSLIM POPULATIONS IN IRELAND (2016) 
 Black % Muslim % Total Population % 
Third-level Education 63 57 48 
Unemployed 20 18 8 
Managers/Professionals 24  36 
Students 26 22 11 
Aged under 35 57 68 47 
 
Source: Own calculations from Statbank tables E8001, E8008, E8010, E8011, EB009, E8065, E8063, E8055. 
Note: No value for Muslim Managers/Professionals is shown because the CSO’s published breakdown on social class by religion 
uses the entire population enumerated on Census night as its base, but its breakdown by ethnicity is based on the ‘usually 
resident population’. This means that the figures would not be comparable. 
 
It is striking how closely the profiles of Black and Muslim people resemble one another. Part 
of the reason for this may be that a considerable number of people fall into both categories. 
According to the 2016 Census, approximately 18.5 per cent of Muslims are Black (11,500 
individuals), and a similar proportion of Black people are Muslims. Recent Irish research has 
also found these groups to be disadvantaged in ways that are not picked up by the headline 
education and primary economic status indicators. This is discussed in Chapter 2.  
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CHAPTER 2  
Previous literature 
This report seeks to contribute to a growing literature on immigration and ethnic and 
religious diversity in Ireland. Broadly speaking, there are three strands of research on this 
topic. First, socio-economic differences between these minority groups and the majority can 
be identified and studied with a view to understanding their causes, one of which may be 
discrimination. These differences typically cover the areas of employment, income, housing, 
health and education (e.g. McGinnity et al., 2018b; 2018c). Second, discrimination against 
these minority groups can be studied directly using a range of methods. These include field 
experiments, analysis of legal records/complaints, analysis of self-reports of discrimination 
(McGinnity et al., 2017; 2018c) or qualitative methods (Michael, 2016; Carr, 2016). Finally, 
researchers can frame the issue of minority integration as an issue for the majority 
population, by examining their attitudes to immigration and diversity (McGinnity et al., 
2018a). 
2.1  PREVIOUS FINDINGS ON GROUP DIFFERENCES AND DISCRIMINATION 
Recent work illustrates that there is considerable variation in socio-economic outcomes 
between ethnic and religious groups in Ireland. McGinnity et al. (2018c) use data from the 
QNHS Equality Modules to investigate labour market outcomes among Black survey 
respondents and compare these outcomes between Irish and non-Irish citizens. Both low 
employment rates and poor representation in highly paid jobs are found among Black non-
Irish citizens, and these relationships persist even when other socio-demographic factors 
such as age, education and duration in Ireland are controlled for (McGinnity et al., 2018c). 
Among Black Irish citizens there is no difference in overall employment rates after 
controlling for socio-demographic factors, but members of this group are much less likely to 
hold managerial/professional positions. Overall, the study concludes that ethnicity is 
influencing labour market outcomes, and that the Black group are disadvantaged relative to 
White Irish respondents.  
Research based on other data shows that African nationals, over two-thirds of whom are 
Black, are disproportionately at risk of poverty, unemployment, and exclusion from the 
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labour market (O’Connell, 2019). Less quantitative research has been carried out on 
outcomes among Muslims in Ireland. Grotti et al. (2018) found Muslims to be at much 
higher risks of homelessness than the rest of the population. This study also found high 
rates of homelessness among Black people. As shown in Chapter 1, Muslims in Ireland are 
more likely to be unemployed than the rest of the population, despite being more likely to 
have a third-level qualification (McGinnity et al., 2018b). 
One approach to understanding how inequities in outcomes emerge for ethnic minorities is 
to use surveys to ask respondents directly about their experience of discrimination. While 
reports may vary depending on the perspective of the respondent, the strength of this 
method lies in the ability to draw on large and representative samples and to cover a wide 
range of situations – e.g. the labour market, housing market, or interaction with 
government or private businesses (Pager and Shepherd, 2008).3 In Ireland, Black people are 
also among the most at-risk groups in terms of the experience of discrimination across a 
range of settings. Controlling for a number of other factors, Black people were found to be 
three times more likely than the White Irish group to report experiencing discrimination in 
the workplace (McGinnity et al., 2017). This is true regardless of whether they are Irish 
citizens or not (McGinnity et al., 2018).  
These findings are supported by recent research by the European Fundamental Rights 
Agency on the experience of discrimination among Black people in Europe. They find that 
32 per cent of Black people from sub-Saharan Africa living in Ireland report having 
experienced discrimination in the labour market, in education (as parents/guardians) or in 
housing on the basis of the colour of their skin. A further 28 per cent report experiencing 
this kind of discrimination on the basis of their ethnic origin. These figures are above the 
average of 12 European countries included in the study, though the samples do differ 
somewhat depending on the country (FRA, 2018).4 
Qualitative research has also documented instances of racism against certain minority 




3  This method can also be combined with others – such as an analysis of outcomes – to give a more 
comprehensive account of the situation of minority groups (Silberman et al., 2007). 
4  Given the challenges of surveying the minority groups studied, sampling strategies varied somewhat across 
the countries in the study (see FRA, 2017, for more details). 
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reporting tool for discrimination and racist incidents, to document the nature of Afrophobia 
in Ireland. The report shows that people of African descent or origin experience Afrophobia 
in diverse ways, with experiences ranging from workplace discrimination to violent assault. 
Similarly, Carr (2016) provides a detailed account of the experience of Islamophobia in 
Dublin. This study employed a careful qualitative design, with nearly 70 individuals from 
diverse ethnic and national backgrounds interviewed. Like with Afrophobia, racism and 
discrimination against Muslims occurs in several arenas of public life, including on public 
transport, in education and in employment. 
To get a more complete picture of the experience of immigrants and ethnic minorities in 
Ireland, it is crucial to consider the extent to which the majority population fosters an 
inclusive environment. Understanding this can yield insights into the emergence of 
discrimination and broader public perceptions of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Field 
experiments, sometimes referred to as audit studies, provide compelling evidence in the 
areas of employment and housing (Neumark, 2018). Typically, in a field experiment, two 
matched fictitious candidates (one from a majority group, one from a minority group) apply 
for the same job or accommodation and responses are recorded, allowing researchers to 
measure the extent of discrimination (McGinnity and Lunn, 2011; Zshcirnt and Rudin, 2016). 
McGinnity et al. (2009) in their field experiment in Ireland in 2008 found that candidates 
with Irish names were twice as likely to get called for interview as candidates with African, 
Asian and German names.5 In a recent study of discrimination in the housing market in 
Ireland, Gusciute (2019) found that Polish applicants were less likely to be invited to view a 
rental property than Irish applicants, and Nigerian applicants were least likely to be invited 
to view a property. For all three groups, men were disadvantaged relative to women.  
Laboratory experiments have been used to test for discriminatory decision-making and to 
try to understand the nature of discrimination. Vignette studies simulate personnel 
decisions made by employers or managers by presenting participants with hypothetical 
scenarios regarding selection of job candidates for hiring, or of employees for training or 




5  Results suggested somewhat higher discrimination against African candidates than the other two 
minorities, but this was not statistically significant, perhaps due to there being a relatively small sample 
size. 
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these workers belong (Neumark, 2018). Another method of assessing discrimination is to 
measure trends in successful legal or tribunal cases in a country over time. This has the 
advantage of independent adjudication of whether discrimination took place but does not 
give an accurate measure of incidence or prevalence of discrimination in society more 
broadly.6 
2.2  ATTITUDES TO DIVERSITY 
The experience of immigrants and ethnic and religious minorities is heavily influenced by 
the way in which they are perceived by the majority or host population. Most studies 
capture this dimension by analysing data garnered from representative surveys. This 
approach seeks to provide a balanced view of the general population. In addition, using 
surveys fielded in multiple countries (such as the European Social Survey or the 
Eurobarometer) allows for cross-national comparison. Here we discuss the theory, findings 
and measurement challenges associated with this literature. 
Theory 
Various explanations have been put forward in the literature to explain negative attitudes. 
Perhaps the most commonly invoked explanation is social identity theory, which states that 
people construct in-groups and out-groups, and exaggerate the positive qualities of the 
former over the latter. Branching from this general theoretical trunk, mid-range theories 
have emerged to understand the proximate mechanism by which negative views of out-
groups (e.g. immigrants or ethnic minorities) emerge. A core explanation put forward is the 
notion of threat, which captures the perception that minority groups, and in particular 
immigrants, compete to define the economic, cultural and social landscape of a given 
society. This perceived threat can be real – relating to jobs, housing, or security – or 
symbolic – concerning threats to the majority culture or values.  
Although feelings of threat are associated with negative views of minority groups and 
immigration, evidence suggests that social interaction can moderate the effect. Contact 




6  Evidence from Ireland suggests only 10 per cent of those affected by discrimination took official or legal 
action (McGinnity et al., 2012).  
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depending on whether the contact is experienced as positive or negative (Pettigrew and 
Tropp, 2011). McGinnity et al. (2018a) find that in Ireland, positive social contact with those 
of a different race/ethnic group is associated with more favourable attitudes to the impact 
of immigration regardless of the frequency of contact.7  
The concept of ethnic hierarchies is an implicit ranking of ethnic groups (Hagendoorn, 2016). 
To some extent, ethnic hierarchies draw on cultural distance, where groups perceived as 
‘more different’ tend to have less status and thus rank lower in the hierarchy. Cultural 
distance often reflects visible markers such as skin colour and dress. There is evidence that 
Muslims are often situated near the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy both in Ireland 
(Mac Gréil, 2011) and elsewhere (Creighton and Jamal, 2015; Snellman and Ekehammar, 
2005; Verkuyten and Kinket, 2000). 
Empirical findings 
McGinnity et al.’s (2018a) analysis of the European Social Survey is the most recent 
empirical evaluation of attitudes in Ireland. They find that people’s appraisals of the value of 
immigrants to the country’s economy, society and cultural life are broadly in line with other 
countries of Western Europe.8 On a scale of zero to ten, average Irish scores on these issues 
range from five to six. There is some evidence that these attitudes track the performance of 
the Irish economy over time.  
McGinnity et al. (2018a) also found that some individual characteristics of the respondents 
are strong predictors of these attitudes. Highly educated respondents are much more 
positive about immigration than those with lower educational qualifications, and 




7  The authors note that as both indicators (social contact and attitudes to immigration) were measured at 
the same point in time, they could not establish definitively whether contact influences attitudes or 
attitudes influence contact. 
8  The European Social Survey asks people the following three questions: ‘Would you say it is generally bad 
or good for Ireland’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?’; ‘And, using this card, 
would you say that Ireland’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here 
from other countries?’; ‘Is Ireland made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from 
other countries?’. Responses are provided on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 to 10.  
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of the international research, attitudes to immigration did not vary significantly according to 
age.  
McGinnity et al. (2018a) also present results from an analysis of attitudes towards Muslim 
immigrants. Irish-born European Social Survey respondents were asked to what extent 
Muslims from other countries should be allowed to come and live in Ireland. Among the 
11 West-European nations considered for comparison in the analysis, Ireland is ranked 
second lowest, with only 40 per cent saying that Ireland should allow ‘many’ or ‘some’ 
Muslims to come. Excluding the current report, there are no recent data on attitudes 
towards Black people in Ireland.  
A more positive picture of Irish attitudes towards immigrants emerges from an alternative 
measure developed by Gallup known as the ‘Migrant Acceptance Index’. This composite 
measure is comprised of scores relating to a direct question on immigrants living in the 
respondent’s country and two questions on ‘social distance’. In this case, the social distance 
questions pertain to having an immigrant as a neighbour and an immigrant marrying a close 
relative. Ireland scores 7.74 out of a maximum of nine, ranking it second in the European 
Union and tenth in the world. A similar picture emerges from Eurobarometer measures of 
social distance, where Ireland ranks third, behind Sweden and Spain, on levels of comfort 
with having an immigrant as a friend, colleague, neighbour, doctor, family member or 
manager (TNS, 2018).  
Measurement challenges 
One challenge in interpreting the findings of surveys of attitudes of the majority population 
is variation in question wording. Scholarship in this area has covered a wide array of topics 
including immigrants, religious groups (such as Muslims), ethnic groups (such as Black 
people) and political/legal groups (such as refugees). Some questions ask about immigrants 
or racial groups living in the host country, while others ask about attitudes towards the 
process of immigration. A common set of questions considers social distance, i.e. the 
respondent’s feelings about having a minority group member as a boss or having one marry 
into the family. Another approach is to ask about respondent’s general feelings/warmth 
towards a group through a ‘feelings thermometer’. Response categories also vary between 
studies. Some offer binary yes/no responses, but in other surveys responses are ordinal 
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(e.g. strongly agree, agree, etc). Feeling thermometers typically produce distributions that 
range from zero to 100.  
That said, it is important to note that despite the diversity of questions and response 
options used in the field, the responses will typically correlate with one another. For 
instance, many of the most influential texts in this area use the terms ‘immigration’ and 
‘immigrants’ interchangeably (Mayda, 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Furthermore, 
immigration tends to overlap with broader concepts of ethnic and religious diversity. Both 
Irish and international research has found a strong link between attitudes towards the 
process of immigration and policies which allow for it on one hand, and attitudes towards 
race and immigrants on the other (McGinnity et al., 2018; Ward and Masgoret, 2008). We 
therefore argue that attitudes to Black and Muslim rights holders in Ireland will be very 
closely linked to attitudes towards the process of more Black and more Muslim people 
coming to Ireland.  
More serious concerns regarding the validity of traditional measures of attitudes have 
emerged from the field of social psychology. One problem is that people often hold 
unconscious biases which are not revealed in surveys. Another concern is that attitudes to 
diversity may be influenced by the settings in which they are expressed. This means that 
attitudes articulated in a survey may not translate to other settings, such as hiring, voting 
and daily interaction with minorities. In particular, research has shown that survey 
respondents tend to conceal negative or ‘socially undesirable’ opinions from survey 
interviewers, for fear of appearing prejudiced.  
These concerns regarding the measurement of attitudes and the bias introduced by 
reporting socially desirable responses have inspired the development of several innovative 
solutions. A lab-based approach is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which addresses 
respondents’ unconscious biases. Participants are prompted to match minority names or 
faces to positive and negative words or concepts as quickly as possible. Participants who are 
relatively slower (faster) in matching minorities to positive (negative) words/concepts are 
deemed to hold a bias against the minority group (see below for more detail).  
Several approaches have also been proposed to resolve the issue of social desirability bias. 
One option is to investigate the effects of negative attitudes, such as online hate speech, 
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directly. A particularly innovative recent study in Ireland by Siapera et al. (2018) used data 
scraped from Twitter and Facebook to analyse patterns of ‘racially-loaded toxic’ online 
speech. They analysed the content of around 6,000 entries, focusing on a variety of groups, 
including immigrants, Black people and Muslims. Anti-immigrant discourse was found to be 
focused on the financial/fiscal burden of immigration (welfare and housing) and how 
morally deserving or otherwise immigrants are. Islamophobic discourse focused on the 
topics of misogyny/sexual deviance, terrorism and the clash of civilisations. Racist speech 
against Black people incorporated anti-immigrant and Islamophobic tropes, but also centred 
on reinforcing stereotypes such as laziness and criminality (Siapera et al., 2018). The authors 
point out that online racist speech can be thought of as a continuum, with extreme, overt 
racist speech at one end, and more subtle, coded racist speech at the other end. The latter 
is less clear and more difficult to decode but is also problematic as it seeks to ‘racialise’ and 
demean the target group. 
An alternative but less commonly used approach to circumvent social desirability bias is to 
employ qualitative research. This is the method used by Byrne (2014) in a study of attitudes 
to immigrants and immigration among Irish professionals. Consistent with the survey 
literature’s concerns about socially desirable responding, the study found that participants 
tailored the expression of their attitudes depending on the social group they were 
interacting with, suggesting that qualitative and quantitative approaches need to be 
cognisant of the risk of bias in reporting of intolerance.  
In an effort to both address the problem of social desirability bias and provide generalisable 
and representative results, an increasingly common technique is the list experiment. This 
approach, described in greater detail below, offers respondents absolute and permanent 
anonymity when expressing their views about controversial or sensitive topics, and is the 
method used in this report. In addition, it provides estimates that are comparable to 
standard direct questions in surveys, which offers a degree of comparability that qualitative, 
lab-based and social media evidence cannot. 
2.3  SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS  
Evidence is mounting that surveys struggle to capture attitudinal data for controversial 
topics. Research has found that controversial opinions change depending on the extent to 
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which anonymity is guaranteed (Phillips and Clancy 1972; Presser and Stinson 1998; Arnold 
and Feldman 1981; Kuklinski et al., 1997a; 1997b; Davis and Silver, 2003; Kuran and 
McCaffery, 2008; Heerwegh, 2009). For topics as distinct as plagiarism for undergraduate 
students (Coutts et al., 2011) to vote-buying (Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson, 2015) to 
attitudes to gay marriage (Glynn, 2013), direct questions have consistently failed to match 
objective evidence from settings in which subjects are given the opportunity to reveal their 
preferences anonymously.  
Theoretically, masking attitudes that are interpretable as controversial (e.g. racist, 
homophobic, Islamophobic) is part of a general strategy employed by individuals to manage 
how they are seen by others. This presentation of self reflects front-stage, (distinct from 
back-stage) aspects of ourselves that can be strategically limited in their open expression 
(Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1959; Kuhn, 1964; Stryker, 1980). Individuals anticipate how a 
given opinion will be interpreted and, depending on whether it could be stigmatised, this 
opinion could be deemed socially undesirable and left unexpressed as part of a strategic 
presentation of self (Goffman, 1963; Stryker, 1980).  
The key finding of empirical work in this area is that respondents adapt their answers to the 
perceived expectations of survey interviewers, which, depending on the question, leads to 
an over- or under-reporting of a given controversial attitude. Of note, the intentional 
masking of attitudes is distinct from intolerance that persists at an unconscious level. 
In other words, masked sentiment reflects a degree of intentionality that unconscious and 
implicit prejudices do not. The difference between what people say upon being asked 
directly and what they might express privately is driven, in theory, by social pressure to offer 
a response perceived to be socially desirable and/or acceptable. This pressure and the 
resultant upward or downward bias in the survey responses, termed ‘social desirability 
bias’, has informed a large body of evidence in recent decades suggesting that mis-reporting 
of certain attitudes can lead to systematic errors when calculating the prevalence of a given 
belief (for a recent review see Krumpal, 2013). It has therefore become increasingly 
recognised that social desirability bias should be accounted for in measuring attitudes and in 
investigating the causes of negativity towards certain groups. 
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That said, it is also important to monitor the prevalence of overt expressions of opposition 
or support for minority groups. Openly expressed negativity towards a certain group has 
tangible impacts on the members of that group. Research has shown that overt hostility, 
harassment and negative media coverage can increase perceptions of discrimination and 
deteriorate health, well-being and performance outcomes (McGinnity and Gijsberts, 2016; 
Williams and Medlock, 2017; Paradies, 2006; Safi, 2010, Wallace et al., 2016). 
2.4  EVIDENCE OF MASKING FROM INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE 
There is evidence that anti-immigrant sentiment is under-reported in surveys. In the United 
States, Janus (2010) found it was significantly more prevalent in the population when 
measured under conditions of absolute and permanent anonymity than when it was asked 
directly on a survey. Creighton et al. (2015) extended this work and found that openly 
expressed anti-immigrant sentiment hardened in the United States after the Great 
Recession, but that no such increase in intolerance was recorded once respondents were 
allowed to express themselves anonymously. In other words, underlying sentiment changed 
little during this period, indicating that economic shocks affect social desirability bias more 
than underlying attitudes. Similarly, measures of immigrant policy preference (Knoll, 2013a) 
and nativism (Knoll, 2013b) are linked to social desirability bias and the misreporting of 
attitudes toward immigrants.  
The extent to which survey respondents conceal negative attitudes towards minorities 
depends on the group in question. For example, Creighton and Jamal (2015) consider public 
opinion about the offer of citizenship to immigrant groups which are defined by religious 
affiliation and find no significant evidence that opposition towards Muslim immigrants is 
masked in the United States. Instead, their results suggest that opposition towards 
immigrants who match the religious practice of the majority in the host population 
(e.g. Christians in the US), is substantively and significantly masked. In contrast, immigrant 
groups that are not co-religionists with the majority (e.g. Muslims in the US) are not subject 
to any significant social desirability pressure to appear tolerant. Preliminary evidence in the 
UK comes to similar conclusions (Creighton et al., 2016). The case of Ireland is largely 
unknown. There is no existing quantitative evidence of social desirability bias in Ireland. 
However, qualitative research suggests that at least some segments of Irish society tend to 
mask or conceal negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Byrne (2014) used 
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unstructured interviews to study attitudes towards immigrants and immigration among Irish 
professionals. The study uncovered negative attitudes among this group but found that the 
expression of these views is often limited to the private sphere. It argues that these 
professionals tend to distance themselves from immigration, by claiming ignorance about 
the subject. It also highlights ‘ethnic hierarchies’ among professionals, whereby newcomers 
from a lower socio-economic background are problematised on the basis of a perceived 
threat to the Irish economy.  
Immigration tends to overlap with racial, ethnic and religious diversity. Multiple studies 
have shown that opposition to people on the basis of all of these attributes is also subject to 
masking. Using a variety of techniques ranging from the extension of anonymity to 
respondents to the use of implicit association tests, the literature has consistently found 
that race-based intolerance is under-reported (Kuklinski et al., 1997a; 1997b; Kuppens and 
Spears, 2014; Heerwig and McCabe, 2009). These results further indicate that measures of 
openly expressed (in)tolerance towards ethnic or racial out-groups are potentially subject to 
pressure to report greater tolerance than actually prevails when opinions are expressed 
implicitly or anonymously. 
In addition, some evidence suggests that masking varies by the characteristics of the 
respondent. In particular, Janus (2010) used a list experiment to study the effect of 
respondent education on social desirability among non-Hispanic White Americans who are 
asked about a policy to restrict immigration. He found that people with college degrees 
were more likely than any other group to mask. However, this was only true of people who 
finished their education after their primary degree. People with post-graduate degrees were 
generally quite positive about immigration when asked directly, and it emerged that this 
was not due to social desirability bias. Other work, by Bazo-Vienrich and Creighton (2018) 
found that the difference between openly and anonymously expressed support for a closed 
border in the US varies significantly by the racial and ethnic identity of the respondent.  
This report is the first quantitative study to consider the extent to which social desirability is 
unevenly distributed across multiple socio-demographic characteristics in Ireland. We 
consider age, gender, educational attainment and levels of financial stress. This is the first 
step in evaluating whether the relationships between attitudes to diversity and these 
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covariates – which emerge from survey data – hold when attitudes are measured 
anonymously. 
Overall, it is increasingly clear that standard efforts to measure anti-immigrant sentiment 
can systematically underestimate the prevalence of opposition. Although targeted 
opposition to some immigrant groups (e.g. Muslims) has been found to be less socially 
undesirable, many other minority attributes, in particular race, do elicit masking. Whether 
considering immigration in general, certain immigrant groups, or the intersection of 
immigration and race/ethnicity, efforts to measure the pattern and prevalence of anti-
immigrant attitudes needs to accurately account for the challenges posed by querying 
sensitive information. 
Social desirability bias exists in concert with other mechanisms that can undermine the 
effectiveness of standard survey questions. Another source of bias is determined by the 
extent to which a topic is considered intrusive, which is rooted in social and cultural context. 
Examples are sexual behaviour, medical history and religiosity. This is distinct from social 
desirability bias in that the attribute might not be perceived to be undesirable, but instead, 
is considered inappropriate to express under the conditions a survey offers – regardless of 
the mode of collection. As pointed out by some (e.g. Krumpal, 2013), this form of bias is 
focused on the sensitivity of the question rather than the response (Fowler, 1995). 
A second, related mechanism accounts for the costs of disclosure. For example, admitting to 
criminality, racism, sexism and homophobia can all incur social and legal consequences. The 
consequences need not be real, but simply the perception that there is any cost associated 
with telling the truth is enough to bias the responses to a given question. In the end – 
whether the mechanism is social desirability bias (i.e. the masking of attitudes to meet 
contextual expectations), intrusiveness, or the cost of disclosure – the ability of respondents 
to feel that their responses are credibly and permanently guaranteed anonymity is crucial.  
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CHAPTER 3  
Data collection and the list experiment 
3.1  HOW THE DATA WERE GATHERED  
A strength of list experiments is that they can be carried out on nationally representative 
data gathered in standard surveys, including telephone surveys (Janus, 2010). The challenge 
is to avoid ‘priming effects’ by collecting the data as part of a survey that is not related to 
the sensitive issue, in this case attitudes to immigration. This list experiment, the first in 
Ireland, was fielded as part of the Economic Sentiment Monitor (ESM).  
The ESM is a monthly telephone survey which collects information on people’s views of the 
economic situation, the housing market and the savings environment in Ireland. The data 
are used to track changes over time in people’s views and experiences. The survey provides 
data for the Consumer Sentiment Index, the Savings Index and input into macro-economic 
modelling. As well as assessing consumer sentiment, the monitor also collects demographic 
information from respondents such as their age, gender, family and marital status, 
education, nationality, employment status, occupation and whether the respondents are 
currently experiencing financial stress. An outline of the ESM survey questionnaire is 
presented in Appendix 2 for information. 
The Economic Sentiment Monitor is a nationally representative survey carried out by the 
ESRI on a monthly basis, with a sample size of 800 respondents, and has been fielded since 
April 2008. A fresh national sample is used each month. Post-stratification is used to select 
the person to be interviewed in each household based on gender, age group and 
employment situation. The numbers required in each category are based on national figures 
from the Quarterly National Household Survey (now called the Labour Force Survey).9 Over 




9  In practice, this involves interviewers (once they make contact with a household) asking to speak, in 
particular, to someone in the ‘difficult to reach’ groups, such as men, younger adults and people with full-
time jobs. 
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mobile telephone (see the appendix of Duffy et al. (2015) for further details of the sampling 
strategy). 
Detailed response rates were compiled by Duffy et al. (2015) and these are indicative of 
more recent response rates. About 19 per cent of landlines initially selected by ESM 
interviewers were deemed eligible for interview (that is, they were in the age/gender/ 
economic status group for which the required number of interviews has not yet been 
completed).  
Since September 2013, the survey has included a mobile-only sample. This sample is 
designed to complete a minimum of 125 interviews each month with people who have a 
mobile telephone but who do not have a landline in the home. This group has increased in 
size and is particularly important among young adults. For the mobile phone sample, there 
is an additional screening criterion in that the survey team seek to include only those who 
do not also have a landline in the home. On average in 2013, only 9 per cent of the 
contacted numbers (5 per cent of the numbers dialled) connect to a person who is eligible 
to be interviewed. Of the connected calls to a person known to be eligible, 52 per cent 
complete the interview. Combining the figures for the landline sample and the mobile 
sample, Duffy et al. (2015) estimate the response rate for the months in 2013 when both 
are included (i.e. from September onwards) is 53 per cent of the contacted numbers known 
to be eligible and 37 per cent when re-calculated to take account of the likely eligibility rate 
among the non-contacts.10 
The data were re-weighted to be fully representative of the national population of adults at 
the time of the survey (June and July, 2017) using the Quarterly National Household Survey 
(QNHS). The weights include sex, age (eight categories), marital status, principal economic 
status, education, region (Dublin, Border, Midlands, West and the rest of the country) and 




10  A large majority of the non-respondents are refusals. There are also numbers where no contact was made. 
In calculating an overall response rate, an assumption needs to be made about whether or not these 
numbers are valid household numbers. If we assume that the eligibility rate is the same among the non-
contacted numbers as among those where eligibility has been determined, 37 per cent is the estimated 
response rate. 
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carried out to harmonise between the treatment and control groups, this adjustment was 
weighted by sex and four age groups. 
The list experiment was inserted in a separate section entitled ‘Opinions on different issues’, 
between a group of questions on personal savings and the background questions. The 
treatment group were read out a list with the sensitive item, and the control group were 
read a list without the sensitive item followed by the direct question (for detailed question 
wording see Section 3.2 below and also Appendix 2).  
3.2  THE LIST EXPERIMENT 
3.2.1  An introduction to the list experiment  
It is not easy to elicit candid responses to sensitive questions. In fact, significant bias in 
responses to surveys that target controversial topics has been pointed out for more than 
four decades (Phillips and Clancy, 1972; Jackman and Muha, 1984; Holbrook and Krosnick, 
2010; Glynn, 2013; Krumpal, 2013). One approach to elicit more honest answers to 
controversial questions is to provide anonymity. Some efforts to increase anonymity focus 
on the mode of interaction, considering more indirect interactions to yield more candid 
answers (e.g. phone vs. online vs. in person). However, regardless of the mode of 
interaction, anonymity is not fully guaranteed if the question is posed directly to the 
respondent.  
Others seek to alleviate bias by considering sub-conscious/unconscious mechanisms. For 
instance, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) can be used to measure the time it takes a 
respondent to sort members of in-groups and out-groups into positive and negative 
categories. Relative delays in sorting members of out-groups into positive categories and 
vice versa are used as measures of sub-conscious intolerance. A drawback of the IAT is that 
the results cannot be compared to standard surveys or public opinion polls. Furthermore, 
because it attempts to measure implicit bias, it only targets sentiment which is 
unintentionally masked.  
Measuring attitudes that are intentionally masked requires a third approach, termed the list 
experiment, which uses permanent and guaranteed anonymity to avoid the possibility of 
identifying an individual response. This alleviates the social pressure to mask controversial 
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attitudes without losing direct comparability with standard measures of public opinion. In 
brief, the list experiment offers a reasonable method to assess negative sentiment towards 
minority groups because it (1) guarantees absolute and permanent anonymity, (2) is easily 
implemented with a representative sample and (3) is directly comparable with measures 
used in standard survey data.  
The list experiment works by presenting respondents with a list of items, and by asking how 
many of them they agree with. Crucially, they are not asked which of the items they agree 
or disagree with. A control sample is given a list of three items, covering topics like 
assistance to the poor, taxation and environmental regulation. A treatment group is 
presented this same list, but with the addition of a focal item that asks about support for 
the controversial topic of interest – more Muslim or Black people coming to Ireland in this 
case. Interviewers were instructed to randomly assign respondents to the treatment and 
control groups. Because both samples are presented the same control list items, any 
difference between the average response to the control and treatment is due to the 
additional (focal) item. At the group level, simply subtracting the average response to the 
control from the average response to the treatment offers a way to ascertain support for 
the focal item (i.e. support for Muslim or Black immigration) under conditions of anonymity.  
The key to the success of the list experiment is that respondents are never asked to 
articulate support for any specific item in the list, which guarantees permanent anonymity 
from the interviewer at the individual level.11 An additional step, which is taken in this 
experiment, is to ask the control group to directly express their support for Black 
immigration (June ESM) or Muslim immigration (July ESM) in the absence of absolute, 
permanent anonymity. This is done via a standard survey question. The difference between 
directly expressed and anonymously expressed support is interpretable as a measure of the 
extent to which support for Black or Muslim immigration is over-stated. In addition, 




11  Unlike temporary anonymity, where an individual’s opinion is recorded and subsequently redacted, under 
conditions of permanent anonymity the person’s opinion, such that it can be attributed to them, is not 
recorded. The survey interviewer never knows which of the items on the list the respondent supports.  
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subgroups of the population (e.g. men and women, different age groups, people with 
different levels of education), though not for any individual respondent.  
3.2.2 Application of the list experiment in Ireland 
The list experiment is specifically designed to manipulate the amount of anonymity 
guaranteed to respondents. As with any experiment, the basic design involves independent 
samples designated as treatment and control groups (see Figure 3.1). In this case two 
control samples were used that correspond to two distinct periods of fieldwork – June and 
July.  




Each independent control sample was presented with the following list question:  
(A [June and July]) The next questions are about your opinion on a few 
different issues in Ireland today. I am going to read out three things 
that you may or may not support. After I read all three, just tell me 
HOW MANY of them you support. I don’t want to know which 
statements, just HOW MANY. 
- Higher weekly State Pension. 
- Lower tax on diesel 
- Bigger fines for litter 
Responses range from zero to three. The distributions of responses for the two 
months of the survey is shown in Figure 3.2. The mean (average) responses for June 
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and July were 2.24 and 2.15 respectively, which indicates that respondents 
supported slightly more than two items in the control list.  
FIGURE 3.2  LIST RESPONSES: CONTROL GROUP 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Sentiment Monitor, June and July 2017. 
 
Two independent treatment groups were presented with an identical set of list 
items as the control samples, but with the following additional focal items 
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(B[June]) More Black people coming to live in Ireland 
(B[July]) More Muslim people coming to live in Ireland 
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Responses to the treatment list questions range from zero to four. The breakdown of these 
responses is shown in Figure 3.3. The mean responses for June and July are higher than the 
control list, at 2.71 and 2.63 respectively. 
The difference between the mean response to the control list question and that of the 
treatment list measures the proportion of respondents who support the additional focal 
item (i.e. Black or Muslim immigration). This difference is the proportion of the Irish 
population that express support for more Black or Muslim immigration under conditions of 
anonymity, which is referred to as anonymously expressed support. One advantage of this 
design is that anonymously expressed support can be compared to support expressed 
without the guarantee of permanent and absolute anonymity, which is referred to as 
directly expressed support. Directly expressed support is captured by the following two 
questions:  
(D[June]) Would you support more Muslim people coming to live in 
Ireland? 
(D[July]) Would you support more Black people coming to live in 
Ireland? 
The resulting data give us a broader picture of support for the immigration of certain groups 
in Ireland. Directly expressed support offers insight into attitudes which are comparable to a 
standard survey of public opinion. Comparing this to anonymously expressed support allows 
us to discern the way in which support changes depending on the extent to which 
respondents are afforded the ability to mask their response.  
A more detailed, technical description of the list experiment methodology is provided in 
Appendix 1. 
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CHAPTER 4  
Attitudes to Black and Muslim immigration to Ireland: Revealed 
and hidden 
 
We seek to present three statistics throughout this chapter: 
• the percentage of people expressing positive attitudes to Black and Muslim 
immigration openly through the direct question on the survey;  
• the percentage of people expressing these opinions anonymously via the list 
experiment; 
• the difference between the two, which is our measure of social desirability bias.  
We calculate these statistics both for the full sample of approximately 1,600 individuals, and 
for sub-samples which are broken down by gender, age, educational attainment and 
whether or not the respondent reports experiencing financial stress. These factors were 
chosen because they frequently emerge as significant predictors of attitudes to minority 
groups in research using survey data (e.g. McGinnity et al., 2018a; Ceobanu and Escandell, 
2010; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Details on the breakdown of these characteristics in 
our sample are provided in Figure 4.1. 
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FIGURE 4.1  SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS, ESM JUNE AND JULY 2017 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Sentiment Monitor, June and July 2017. 
 
The groups have been divided so that no single group comprises less than 35 per cent of the 
sample. This is why an age cut-off of 50 years was selected. We consider people with a 
higher education certificate/diploma, a primary degree or a post-graduate qualification to 
have third-level educational attainment. Financial stress is measured by asking the 
respondent how difficult it is for them to ‘make ends meet’. We consider people who report 
making ends meet ‘with great difficulty’, ‘with difficulty’ or ‘with some difficulty’ to be under 
financial stress. The data are weighted to ensure that they are representative of the 
population.  
We present our results through a series of colour coded charts. Attitudes to the Black group 
are displayed in blue, and attitudes to the Muslim group are shown in yellow. The lighter 
shades show the openly expressed measure, which is the proportion responding positively 
to the direct question posed to the control groups. The darker shades of blue and yellow 
represent the anonymously expressed measure, which is calculated by measuring the 
difference between the mean scores on the lists for the control and treatment groups.  
Our measure of social desirability is captured by the vertical arrows in each graph. Where 
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between the directly and anonymously expressed measures.12 Alternatively, these can be 
interpreted as the percentage of the relevant sample who ‘mask’ – i.e. who hold negative 
attitudes but choose not to reveal them to the survey interviewer. Throughout, we refer to 
respondents ‘holding but concealing’ negative attitudes or lack of support. Here we 
explicitly mean that they conceal them from the interviewer. We cannot tell how likely it is 
that they would conceal them in other settings. The charts in this chapter are based on the 
full sample, but we report results using a slightly smaller sample which excludes 74 non-Irish 
respondents, where these findings differ from those using the full sample.  
4.1  ATTITUDES TO BLACK AND MUSLIM IMMIGRATION  
Figure 4.2 shows the results for the full samples from both months of the survey. We first 
consider what proportion of the samples said they would support more Black or Muslim 
people coming to Ireland. The percentage of people who favour more Black people coming 
to Ireland, which stands at 66 per cent, is the only recent estimate of its kind. Support for 
more Muslims coming to Ireland is lower, at 59 per cent. However, this figure is higher than 
previous estimates. According to the 2014 European Social Survey, which is the most 
comparable dataset we have, 11 per cent of the Irish-born population said that ‘many’ 
Muslims should be allowed to come in Ireland, 30 per cent favoured allowing ‘some’, 
34 per cent would allow ‘a few’ to come and a quarter said that none should be allowed to 
come. Here of course, the question format is significantly different, because the control 
group is asked a binary yes/no question. Furthermore, the question is specifically about 
support for inward migration of these groups. As there is no option to express ‘neutral’ 
opinions about Black and Muslim immigration, that is ‘don’t know’ or ‘don’t mind either 
way’, we cannot interpret a lack of support as opposition towards these groups. However, 
we do not expect this to alter the pattern of results.  
Next, we consider the anonymously expressed scores, and their distance from the direct 
measures, which we interpret as an indicator of social desirability or masking. We find that 




12  We determine a finding to be statistically significant if the observed difference between overt and 
anonymously expressed scores is highly unlikely (less than 10 per cent) to be a result of chance. The 
probability that a finding is a result of chance is called a ‘p-value’. 
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almost entirely due to different rates of social desirability on each item. When we give the 
respondent the opportunity to conceal their views within the list, attitudes towards the two 
groups level out at 51 per cent for Black people and 53 per cent for Muslims.  
Respondents in Ireland are much more likely to overstate support for the Black ethnic group 
than for the Muslim group. Anonymity reduces the prevalence of positive attitudes to the 
Black ethnic group by 15 percentage points, and attitudes to the Muslim group by six points, 
but the latter is not statistically significant.  
FIGURE 4.2 SUPPORT FOR BLACK AND MUSLIM PEOPLE COMING TO IRELAND  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Sentiment Monitor, June and July 2017. 
Note:  The arrow indicates statistically significant masking or social desirability bias. * indicates p <0.05. Data are weighted.  
 
Anonymously expressed support for various groups is difficult to compare internationally as 
there are no list experiments with precisely the same wording, and responses are very 
sensitive to question wording, as is the extent of socially desirability bias in those responses. 
The closest example is a series of similar experiments in the UK, which considered openly 
and anonymously expressed attitudes to Muslim and Black Caribbean immigration. These 
list experiments were embedded in two waves of Understanding Society’s Innovation Panel 
(IP) in 2015 and 2016. Comparing the results, we see that both directly and anonymously 
expressed attitudes appear to be more positive in Ireland. For instance, in each wave of the 
IP panel, overt support for Caribbean immigration was only 60 per cent, compared to 
66 per cent support for Black immigration in Ireland. Overt support was also a good deal 
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(Creighton et al., 2016; Benzeval et al., 2017). Of course, these groups are not entirely 
comparable, not least because very little immigration of Black people in Ireland is from the 
Caribbean. However, a similar pattern of results emerges for attitudes to Muslim 
immigration. Between 40 and 49 per cent of UK respondents openly expressed support for 
Muslim immigration, compared 60 per cent in Ireland. The anonymously expressed support 
for Muslim immigration was also lower in the UK, at between 30 and 36 per cent second 
(Creighton et al., 2016; Benzeval et al., 2017). 
In a Dutch survey experiment in 2014, 62 per cent of respondents supported the statement 
that the Netherlands should allow more people of the same ethic group when directly 
expressed, but only 19 per cent of respondents supported this when anonymously 
expressed. A similar proportion (62 per cent) supported immigrants of the different race 
coming to the Netherlands, but this compares to 40 per cent of the sample who 
anonymously expressed support for people of a different race coming to the Netherlands. 
This anonymously expressed support for immigrants of a different race coming to the 
Netherlands is lower than anonymously expressed support for more Black people coming to 
Ireland in Figure 4.2 (51 per cent). However, the question wording is rather different in the 
two experiments, so they are not directly comparable.  
The findings suggest that people in Ireland who hold negative attitudes towards Muslim 
immigration consider it acceptable to honestly express those attitudes, but that survey 
respondents feel the need to conceal negative attitudes towards Black immigration. In the 
absence of other list experiments in Ireland, it is not clear whether this pattern can be 
explained by particularly high levels of social desirability bias in the responses to the 
question about Black immigration, or particularly low levels in the responses to the Muslim 
immigration question.  
That said, the results are consistent with a growing body of international scholarship which 
finds that attitudes towards Muslim immigrants and immigration are less sensitive to 
masking. For instance, Creighton and Jamal’s (2015) study of granting citizenship to Muslim 
and Christian immigrants in the United States shows that respondents conceal a 
considerable amount of resistance to Christian immigrants, but Muslim immigrants are 
afforded no such protection. The aforementioned work using list experiments in the UK 
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shows less masking of opposition to Muslim immigrants, relative to immigrants from 
Eastern Europe and the Caribbean (Creighton et al., 2016; Benzeval et al., 2017).  
One explanation for this variation may be that religion, unlike race, is viewed as a choice. 
Another could be a belief that Islam is incompatible with the norms of Western society and 
can therefore be justifiably rejected. Storm (2018) argues that hostility towards immigrants 
in Europe stems from notions of non-conformity with the host country. In her analysis, 
survey respondents who adhere to the majority religious denomination are more likely to 
view immigration negatively, while members of minority religious groups are significantly 
more positive.  
The following discussion is motivated by the question of whether attitudes and masking of 
socially undesirable opinions vary across the population. The analysis is repeated for 
different groups in the population and reveals interesting patterns. Social desirability bias 
varies according to age, sex and educational attainment. Some of these relationships also 
vary depending on whether the questions relate to Black or Muslim immigration. 
4.2  GENDER AND ATTITUDES  
Figure 4.3 shows the breakdown by gender. We find that men are more positive to Black 
immigration than women are on the direct measure, but this gender difference disappears 
when we focus on the anonymously expressed scores. About 72 per cent of men state 
directly that they would support more Black people coming to Ireland, compared to just 
61 per cent of women. Men and women show identical anonymously expressed attitudes to 
Black people – 51 per cent of each are positive.  
Regarding support for the Black ethnic group, social desirability affects 21 per cent of men in 
the sample, but less than 10 per cent of the women in the sample. The gender difference in 
openly expressed attitudes is thus ‘washed out’ by social desirability bias. 
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FIGURE 4.3 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR MORE BLACK AND MUSLIM PEOPLE 
COMING TO IRELAND  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Sentiment Monitor, June and July 2017. 
Notes:  Arrows indicate statistically significant masking or social desirability bias. † indicates p. <0.1 and * indicates p <0.05. Data are 
weighted. While the anonymously expressed score on attitudes towards Muslims appears to be higher than the directly 
expressed score among men, this difference is not statistically significant. 
 
The relationship between gender and social desirability is reversed when support for more 
Muslim people coming to Ireland is the topic of the question. For men, 59 per cent support 
more Muslims coming to Ireland in the direct question and 67 per cent support more 
Muslims coming to Ireland when anonymously expressed, though this difference is not 
statistically significant.  
For women, 61 per cent support more Muslim people coming to Ireland when asked 
directly, but only 40 per cent of women do when asked anonymously. Thus, over one-fifth 
of this sample of women ‘overstate’ their support for Muslims. They do not actually support 
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The intersection of multiple embedded and overlapping negative perceptions of Muslims 
may contribute to what Helbling and Traunmüller (2018) label ‘double opposition’ towards 
this group. On the one hand, some people are opposed to immigration in general, that is 
more of any group coming to their country. On the other, some who have little issue with 
immigration in general take exception to perceptions of incompatible cultural norms 
relating to gender and sexuality among Muslims.  
4.3  AGE AND ATTITUDES  
Figure 4.4 displays the results by age categories. We split the sample in two, with one group 
aged 16-49 and the other aged 50 or older.13 The expected relationship between age and 
tolerance, whereby younger people express more positive attitudes to ethnic and religious 
minorities, is borne out by the results on the direct survey item. Support for the Black ethnic 
group among the younger respondents (aged under 50), at 78 per cent, is 27 percentage 
points higher than support among older people (those aged 50 and over). On the question 
about Muslims, there is less of an age gradient, but the under 50s still score over 
10 percentage points higher (almost 65 per cent) than those over 50 (53 per cent).  
When anonymously expressed results are considered, this age difference is smaller. 
Regarding more Black people coming to Ireland, 59 per cent of those under 50 are 
supportive, compared to 40 per cent of those aged 50 or over. Regarding support for 
Muslims, the age difference disappears: 54 per cent of the younger group (aged under 50) 
and 53 per cent of the older group (aged 50 and over) are supportive of more Muslim 
people coming to Ireland (see Figure 4.4).  
This suggests that those aged 50 and over are somewhat less likely to mask negative 
opinions than those aged under 50. Only 11 per cent of those aged 50 and over mask their 
negative opinions when asked about the Black ethnic group, compared to nearly 19 per cent 




13  Given the sample size, it was only possible to consider two age groups, but note that these age bands are 
very wide, and any reference to ‘younger’ and ‘older’ in this experiment refers simply to ‘under 50’ and ‘50 
and older’ respectively.  
14  In fact, if we exclude non-Irish respondents from the sample, masking among those 50 and over drops to 
9.6 per cent and becomes statistically insignificant.  
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negative attitudes towards Muslims, while the data suggest that over 10 per cent of people 
under 50 mask their true preferences on this issue.15 
FIGURE 4.4 AGE (UNDER 50/50+) AND SUPPORT FOR MORE BLACK AND MUSLIM PEOPLE 
COMING TO IRELAND  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Sentiment Monitor, June and July 2017. 
Notes:  The younger category is comprised of respondents aged 16-49 and the older category is comprised of respondents aged 50 or 
older. Arrows indicate statistically significant masking or social desirability bias. †indicates p. <0.1 and * indicates p <0.05. Data 
are weighted. 
 
The finding that there is no age difference in anonymously expressed attitudes to Muslims is 
interesting, because age is typically viewed as a robust and consistent predictor of these 
attitudes in the existing research using surveys with direct questions, albeit with much more 
fine-grained age categories (for example see Strabac and Listhaug, 2008, for comparative 
analysis; Fahey et al., 2019 for Ireland).16 That said, the age bands used in the list 
experiment are very wide: comparing attitudes of those under 30 with those over 65, for 




15  That said, with a smaller sample excluding non-Irish respondents, the proportion of under 50s masking on 
this question drops to under 9 per cent and becomes statistically insignificant.  
16  Strabac and Listhaug (2008) measure age in decades; Fahey et al. (2019) use four age categories: age under 
25; 25-44; 45-64; 65+. Fahey et al. (2019) find a stepwise age pattern, with each older group being less 
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4.4  EDUCATION AND ATTITUDES  
An even more consistent finding in the literature on attitudes to diversity emerging from 
survey data is that higher educational attainment leads to more positive attitudes towards 
minority groups, in particular to immigrants (e.g. Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). However, 
there remains considerable debate on the causal mechanisms behind the effect. One school 
of thought focuses on the directly liberalising effect of education. Here it is argued that the 
very experience of attending a third-level educational institution exposes people to a more 
diverse set of ideas and people (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Another view concerns the 
fact that the highly educated tend to have more secure jobs and higher incomes than those 
with lower educational qualifications. The less educated are likely to be more directly in 
competition with immigrants for jobs and resources such as housing, services and social 
welfare (Mayda, 2006). Feeling threatened by immigrants, the less educated are more likely 
to express negativity towards them in attitudinal surveys. A third view, which is supported 
by these findings, is that people with higher educational attainment do not in fact hold more 
positive attitudes but are more likely to conceal negativity when asked a direct question in 
a survey.  
Figure 4.5 shows that the highly educated, who are defined as having a third-level 
qualification (diploma, degree or higher), are more likely to openly express support for both 
groups when asked a direct question. Over four in every five respondents with a third-level 
qualification (81 per cent) say that more Black people should be allowed to come and live in 
Ireland, compared to just 57 per cent of those without a third-level qualification. A similar 
pattern emerges for the question about more Muslims coming to Ireland, but the difference 
is less pronounced. Sixty-seven per cent of the highly educated and 55 per cent of the less 
educated openly say that they would support more Muslim people coming to Ireland.  
However, looking at the anonymously expressed measure, we find that these relationships 
disappear. Now we find 49 per cent of those without a third-level qualification supporting 
more Black people coming to Ireland, compared to 54 per cent of those with a third-level 
qualification (see Figure 4.5). Fifty-nine per cent of those without a third-level qualification 
and 45 per cent of those with a third-level qualification support more Muslim people 
coming to Ireland. Neither of these differences are statistically significant.  
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Figure 4.5 shows that social desirability is highly concentrated in the most educated groups. 
While there is some evidence of masking among the less educated with respect to Black 
immigration (8.5 per cent),17 this pales in comparison to the highly educated group, over a 
quarter of whom (26.8 per cent) hold but conceal negative attitudes. The difference is as 
large in the Muslim survey. No statistically significant masking occurs with the less educated, 
but over a fifth (21.6 per cent) of the highly educated sample mask their views regarding 
Muslims (see Figure 4.5).  
FIGURE 4.5 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SUPPORT FOR MORE BLACK AND MUSLIM 
PEOPLE COMING TO IRELAND  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Sentiment Monitor, June and July 2017. 
Note:  The lower educated group is comprised of respondents whose highest level of educational attainment is technical or vocational 
schooling, Leaving Certificate or lower. People with post-secondary education – higher diplomas, degrees or postgraduate 
qualifications – are counted as highly educated. Arrow indicates statistically significant masking or social desirability bias. 
† indicates p. <0.1 and * indicates p <0.05. Data are weighted. While the anonymously expressed score on attitudes towards 
Muslims appears to be higher than the directly expressed score among the less educated, this difference is not statistically 
significant.  
 
The findings about the extent of social desirability bias in attitudes to Black and Muslim 
immigration among the highly educated is particularly noteworthy given that those with 
decision-making power over the allocation of resources like jobs and housing tend to have 
higher education.  
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Following qualitative interviews and participant observation among highly educated Irish 
professionals, she concludes that there is considerable resistance to immigrants and 
immigration among this group in Ireland, but this is carefully concealed using a variety of 
strategies, such as claiming ignorance in the topic of immigration and rationalising anti-
immigrant sentiment in terms of economic threat.  
4.5  FINANCIAL STRESS AND ATTITUDES 
McGinnity et al. (2018a) found that people under financial stress report more negative 
attitudes to immigrants in Ireland. Here we investigate whether there are differences in 
masking between those who do or do not experience financial stress. We deem an 
individual to be under financial stress if they report ‘some difficulty’, ‘difficulty’ or ‘great 
difficulty’ making ends meet.  
When asked a direct question, Figure 4.6 shows that 71 per cent of those with low or no 
financial stress support more Black people coming to Ireland, compared to 62 per cent of 
those with difficulty making ends meet. Fifty-eight per cent of those with no financial stress 
support more Muslim people coming to Ireland, compared to 60 per cent of those with 
difficulty making ends meet. Comparing anonymously expressed support, we find 58 per 
cent of those with no financial stress and 46.6 per cent of those with difficulty making ends 
meet support more Black people coming to Ireland. Regarding more Muslim people coming 
to Ireland, 49 per cent of the group experiencing no financial stress are supportive, and 58 
per cent of those experiencing financial stress are supportive.  
Compared to the other sub-groups, financial stress appears not to be a major factor in 
explaining social desirability in this experiment. On the question of Black immigration, social 
desirability is comparable between the two groups, at 13.4 per cent and 15.6 per cent. In 
the question about Muslim immigration, there is some (weak) evidence of masking among 
the low financial stress group, but the effect is just outside the limits of statistical 




18  Excluding non-Irish respondents, we find slightly greater masking among the low financial stress group: 
10 per cent mask negative opinions towards Muslim immigration and this is statistically significant.  
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FIGURE 4.6 FINANCIAL STRESS AND SUPPORT FOR MORE BLACK AND MUSLIM PEOPLE 
COMING TO IRELAND  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Sentiment Monitor, June and July 2017. 
Notes:  Respondents who report making ends meet with some difficulty, with difficulty, or with great difficulty are counted as being under 
high financial stress. † indicates p. <0.1 and * indicates p <0.05. Data are weighted. 
 
The survey did not record whether respondents themselves were born outside Ireland, but a 
small number of respondents reported a nationality other than Irish. There were not 
enough of this group to explore the differences between Irish and non-Irish respondents in 
the experiment, but as a robustness check, we re-estimated all the analysis with a modified 
sample which excludes the 74 respondents who report non-Irish nationality, (just under 
5 per cent of the sample of circa 1,600). As expected, non-Irish nationals were evenly 
distributed across both months and the control and treatment groups. This modification to 
the sample left most of the findings unchanged, but there were some small differences to 
the findings reported earlier in this chapter that are described below and referenced above 
where relevant.  
Among respondents aged 50 and older, the difference between directly and anonymously 
expressed attitudes towards the Black ethnic group dropped from 10.9 per cent to 
9.6 per cent. This was enough to increase the p-value from 0.09 to 0.12, thus rendering it an 
insignificant difference by our standards of confidence and implying no masking among 
older respondents using this smaller sample. The difference between the directly and 
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the Muslim group. In the original analysis, we found that 10.7 per cent of this sub-sample 
masked, and that this was significant at the 10 per cent level. With non-Irish nationals 
excluded, the gap dropped to 8.8 per cent and became statistically insignificant, suggesting 
no significant masking among respondents aged less than 50 using the smaller sample.  
However, there were also some slight differences in findings using the smaller sample which 
suggested greater masking among the less educated group. We found in the original 
analysis that 8.5 per cent of the population masked negative attitudes towards Black 
immigrants. This changed to 11.4 per cent when we excluded non-Irish respondents, and 
the p-value was reduced from just under 0.10 to just under 0.05. Similarly, among those 
who do not experience financial stress, we found that excluding the non-Irish increased the 
gap between directly and anonymously expressed support for Muslim immigration from a 
statistically insignificant 9.6 per cent to a marginally significant 10.1 per cent  
(p-value = 0.097). 
We believe that it is best practice to report the analysis of the full sample (including non-
Irish nationals) in the main body of this report. The study seeks to tap the attitudes of the 
population in Ireland towards more Black and Muslim people coming to Ireland. Because 
non-Irish nationals form a part of the non-Irish population, and because their attitudes to 
different groups are also important, there was no reason to exclude them. 
4.6  DO ANONYMOUSLY EXPRESSED SCORES DIFFER BETWEEN GROUPS? 
Table 4.1 compares scores on the anonymously expressed item between categories on the 
four socio-demographic variables and formally tests the differences. We present p-values 
below each comparison to assess whether the differences between the categories are 
statistically significant. Conventionally, p-values at or below 0.05 are deemed to be 
significant, and we highlight these results in the Table. The purpose of this analysis is to see 
to what extent widely held understandings about the relationship between personal 
characteristics and attitudes to diversity hold when analysing attitudes expressed under 
conditions of anonymity. 
We see that when we consider anonymously expressed support, there are only two 
significant differences between groups. Men are significantly more positive about Muslim 
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people coming to Ireland than women, and those under 50 are significantly more positive 
than those aged 50 and older about Black immigration.  
TABLE 4.1  GROUP VARIATION IN ANONYMOUSLY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR MORE 
BLACK AND MUSLIM PEOPLE COMING TO IRELAND  
    Black  Muslim  
Gender Male 51% 67% 
Gender Female 51% 40% 
Gender P-value 0.98 0.00 
Age Under 50 59% 54% 
Age 50 and older  40% 53% 
Age P-value 0.04 0.88 
Educational Attainment Leaving Certificate or below  49% 59% 
Educational Attainment Third-Level Education 54% 45% 
Educational Attainment P-value 0.53 0.12 
Financial Stress Low or no Financial Stress 58% 49% 
Financial Stress High or some Financial Stress 47% 58% 
Financial Stress P-value 0.20 0.32 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Sentiment Monitor, June and July 2017. 
Note:  Anonymously expressed scores derived from the lists. Data are weighted. 
 
In some ways, however, the most interesting findings here are the similarities between 
groups rather than the differences. In the context of the existing literature, it is striking that 
third-level education does not result in significantly more positive attitudes towards either 
group. It is also surprising that the negative relationship between age groups and attitudes 
towards Black people is not sustained for attitudes towards Muslims, at least for the 
relatively wide age bands used here. Finally, financial stress has no significant effect on 
anonymously expressed support for these groups. Although people experiencing financial 
stress appear to be more positive towards immigration by Muslims, the opposite is the case 
for attitudes towards immigration by Black people. However, neither difference is 
statistically significant.  
4.7  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The analysis in this chapter shows that social desirability is influenced by both the 
characteristics of the minority group in question – Black or Muslim – and by the 
characteristics of the respondents themselves. We find that people are more likely to mask 
negative opinions when asked about the Black ethnic group than the Muslim group, 
resulting in similar anonymously expressed support for each group.  
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Social desirability is found to vary by the age and educational attainment of the respondent. 
People aged under 50 are more likely to mask negative opinions about both Black people 
and Muslim people coming to Ireland. In fact, we detect no significant masking among 
survey respondents aged 50 and over with respect to the question on the Muslim group. 
A similar picture emerges with educational attainment. One-in-four people with a third-level 
qualification ‘overstate’ their support: they do not support more Black people coming to 
Ireland but choose to conceal this when asked directly. One-fifth of the higher-educated 
group conceal negative attitudes towards Muslim immigration. By contrast, only 8.5 per 
cent of respondents with the equivalent of a Leaving Certificate or lower mask their 
attitudes to Black immigration, and we find no significant masking for the lower-educated 
with respect to immigration by Muslims. 
Finally, evidence emerges that there is an important relationship between the group in 
question and the gender of the respondent. We see that almost twice as many men hold 
but conceal lack of support for Black immigration (21 per cent compared to 9.6 per cent), 
but that this gender pattern is reversed on the question of more immigration by Muslims. 
Here we find no significant masking among men, but that over a fifth of women conceal 
their lack of support for Muslim immigration. 
These differential rates of masking across sub-groups of the population mean that patterns 
of positivity towards immigration change considerably when using anonymously expressed 
measures instead of direct survey items. When we guarantee respondents’ permanent 
anonymity, we see that group differences in responses are much smaller. Only two 
differences are statistically significant – women are more negative towards more Muslim 
immigration than men; and respondents aged 50 and older are more negative towards Black 
immigration than younger people. However, no effect of education (third-level versus 
Leaving Certificate equivalent or less) or financial stress (low versus high stress) was found 
for either group when considering anonymously expressed measures. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Summary and implications of findings 
5.1  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
Ireland has become considerably more diverse in terms of ethnic, national and religious 
origin in recent decades. This study investigates how the Irish population has responded to 
this. Attitudinal data provide an important indicator of the climate towards groups like 
immigrants and ethnic and religious minorities. However, international evidence suggests 
that people may not reveal their true opinions to sensitive questions in a social survey, 
partly for fear of revealing socially undesirable answers (Krumpal, 2013). This report used an 
innovative technique to explore support for more Black and Muslim people coming to 
Ireland and to what extent this support expressed might be influenced by social desirability 
bias. It is the first application of this technique, the ‘list experiment’, in Ireland using two 
waves of a nationally representative Economic Sentiment Monitor in the summer of 2017.  
A major finding of the report (see Figure 4.2) is that social desirability is significantly more 
prominent in questions relating to Black people than to Muslim people. This suggests that 
many people in Ireland who hold negative attitudes towards Muslims believe that their 
opinions are socially acceptable, unlike people who hold negative attitudes towards Black 
immigration. This echoes previous findings on attitudes to Muslims in the United States and 
respondents’ willingness to express negative attitudes towards them (Creighton and Jamal, 
2015; Creighton et al., 2016; Benzeval et al., 2017).  
When asked directly, there is greater support among the Irish population for Black people 
coming to Ireland (66 per cent), than for Muslim people coming to Ireland (59 per cent). 
When offered anonymity in the list experiment, support for Black and Muslim immigration 
are at the same level – about half of the population support each. About 15 per cent of the 
population mask lack of support for the Black ethnic group, but we find no such evidence for 
attitudes to Muslims. 
Previous research in Ireland and abroad using direct questions from survey data finds a large 
difference between highly educated respondents and those with lower education in terms 
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of attitudes to immigrants and immigration. A striking finding of this report is that under 
conditions of anonymity no such education differences are found, at least in this sample. 
Using a direct question, 80 per cent of highly educated respondents support more Black 
people coming to Ireland, compared to 55 per cent of those with no post-secondary 
qualifications (Leaving Certificate or lower). When we analyse the List results, support falls 
to 54 per cent for those with higher education, and to 49 per cent with lower education. 
When we consider anonymously expressed attitudes, there is no statistically significant 
difference by educational attainment on this item. A similar pattern of greater masking 
among the more highly educated is found in attitudes to Muslim immigration, though to a 
lesser extent. This suggests that at least for Ireland, much of the education differences in 
openly expressed attitudes to immigrants and minority groups may be due to social 
desirability bias. It is not that the highly educated have learned tolerance to diversity, 
instead they have learned to conceal socially undesirable attitudes. This finding is important 
because people who make decisions – for example in the workplace, the housing market, in 
financial institutions and in policymaking – in Ireland are much more likely to be highly 
educated.  
These findings are consistent with the qualitative work of Byrne (2014), ‘Performing 
Distance’ who finds resistance to immigration, particularly to immigrants from minority 
ethnic groups, among a group of highly educated Irish professionals. Yet this resistance is 
carefully hidden in everyday interaction by a range of strategies.  
Another finding in this report concerns the age of respondents, albeit using two very wide 
age bands. Responses to the direct question indicate that those aged less than 50 are more 
supportive of these groups than those aged 50 or older. However, because the under 50s 
are much more likely to mask their lack of support, the age differences in anonymously 
expressed scores are not so marked. Nearly 60 per cent of under 50s support Black 
immigration compared to 40 per cent of those aged 50 and over according to the lists. There 
are no age differences in anonymously expressed support for Muslim immigration, just over 
half of each age group support more Muslims coming to Ireland. It is not that those aged 
under 50 are more tolerant of Muslims than those aged 50 or older, they are simply more 
likely to hide or mask negative attitudes.  
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Gender differences in masking of negative attitudes vary according to the immigrant group 
in question. Men are substantially more likely to mask lack of support for the Black ethnic 
group, but masking of lack of support for Muslims is confined to women. Twenty-one per 
cent of men conceal lack of support for Black immigration compared to 10 per cent of 
women. While men seem more supportive when asked directly, there is no gender 
difference in attitudes towards Black immigration under conditions of anonymity (just over 
half of men and women support more Black people coming to Ireland). Women, by contrast, 
mask negativity towards Muslims to a much greater extent. Over one-fifth of women hold 
but conceal their lack of support for Muslims in the survey. While there is no difference 
between men and women in terms of support for Muslim people coming to Ireland when 
asked directly, a large and statistically significant gender difference appears on anonymously 
expressed scores, with women being much less supportive of Muslim immigration to Ireland 
(40 per cent support this) than men (67 per cent support this).  
5.2  LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
An obvious limitation of this report is that it does not consider attitudes to White 
immigration. Research from the UK and the Netherlands found significant masking of 
attitudes towards White immigrants (Creighton et al., 2018; Creighton et al., 2016; Benzeval 
et al., 2017). White immigrants are less likely to experience discrimination than Black 
immigrants in a range of domains in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 2017), and data from the 
European Social Survey suggest Irish respondents are more supportive of White immigrants 
coming to Ireland than different ethnic groups (McGinnity et al., 2018a; Fahey et al., 2019). 
However, this does not rule out an element of hidden intolerance which would be 
interesting to investigate. 
As discussed above, evidence on how attitudes influence behaviour is somewhat lacking. 
The list experiment technique is limited in this regard given that it is not possible to directly 
investigate the link between anonymously-expressed attitudes elicited from list experiments 
and individual-level behaviours. This is because the design of the list technique means that 
the anonymously-expressed attitudes of any given individual are not identified in list 
experiments, in order to preserve respondent anonymity and ‘allow’ respondents to reveal 
socially undesirable responses. The concept of ‘permanent anonymity’ means that while 
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researchers can compare group-level differences between direct and anonymous responses, 
the masking of negative attitudes cannot be attributed to any individual respondent.  
Notwithstanding the limits of this technique, further research using different methods about 
how attitudes influence behaviour could enhance our understanding of the implications of 
attitudes to different groups. Perhaps the most promising avenue is in the area of 
laboratory experiments, either using vignette studies in employment or housing, followed 
by questions on (explicit) attitudes, or the Implicit Association Test of implicit attitudes (see 
Chapter 2). An alternative experiment would test behaviour towards different ethnic groups 
(for example through trust or gift-giving games) in a laboratory setting and follow up with 
questions probing either implicit or explicit attitudes.  
The findings of this report, combined with the fact that the list experiment can be 
incorporated relatively easily and cheaply into social surveys, makes a strong case for 
including a list for sensitive questions on standard social surveys in Ireland, or indeed 
international surveys like the European Social Survey or the Eurobarometer. Including list 
experiments in European-wide surveys would permit comparisons of social desirability bias 
and anonymously expressed attitudes across Europe. At present it is difficult to compare 
Ireland to other countries in this regard due to differences in question wording in individual 
experiments.  
Given evidence of socially desirable responses to immigration from different minority 
groups in this experiment, it would be interesting to use the method to investigate other 
social attitudes and attitudes to other equality groups in Ireland, such as gays and lesbians, 
Travellers, or people with disabilities. The list technique could also be applied to social 
distance scales – how respondents would feel about having someone from a specific group 
as their colleague or boss, and how response patterns are affected by social desirability bias. 
As the technique has also been used to investigate socially undesirable behaviour such as 
marital infidelity and shoplifting (Krumpal, 2013), it could be used to investigate not only 
attitudes to diversity but past discriminatory behaviour towards different groups. For 
example, a more focused list experiment of employers or landlords could ask whether they 
had turned down someone on the basis of minority group membership. Using the list 
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method could address some of the concerns regarding socially desirable responses about 
discriminatory behaviour. 
5.3  IMPLICATIONS 
Investigating and reporting covert or hidden attitudes does not mean that openly expressed 
hostility to (or support for) certain groups is not important. After all, much of social life is 
carried out in the open – from everyday social interaction to major social protests. For 
minority groups, it is a very different experience to live in a society that is openly intolerant 
of them than one where negative views may be held but not expressed. It is likely that 
different types of attitudes (openly and anonymously expressed) will result in different kinds 
of behaviour and in different outcomes for the minority groups in question.  
Attitudes, behaviours and outcomes 
There is substantial evidence that openly expressed negativity towards minority groups can 
harm health and well-being among members of these groups. Openly expressed antagonism 
like racial harassment may have damaging consequences, both in terms of mental and 
physical health and well-being (Wallace et al., 2016). Williams and Medlock (2017) report on 
a body of research in the United States which suggests that negative news or media 
coverage of an ethnic or racial group can have a detrimental impact on health among 
members of that group. Harassment and negative media coverage are also linked to 
perceptions of discrimination, which in turn affect well-being and migrant integration 
(Safi, 2010).  
Covert attitudes might be more likely to impact on behaviours and decisions that occur in 
private. Indeed, international evidence on the link between (openly expressed) negative 
attitudes and discriminatory behaviour tends to highlight socially desirable responding as 
being one reason why attitudes towards ethnic minorities are not always good predictors of 
discriminatory behaviour uncovered using field experiments (Pager and Quillian, 2005; 
Carlsson and Rooth, 2012). In addition, some laboratory experiments indicate that subtle 
attitudes best predict subtle (but powerful) behaviours, whereas overt attitudes predict 
overt behaviours (Dovidio et al., 2002). This suggests that anonymously expressed attitudes 
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to groups might be a better predictor of some types of behaviour than directly expressed 
attitudes.19 
One important example of a private decision is recruitment. Employers may be openly 
tolerant of one group, such as the Black ethnic group, but their covert beliefs may influence 
their decisions about who to hire. Indeed, this report’s finding that people are much more 
negative towards Black people coming to live here when asked indirectly is consistent with 
existing research which has found very high levels of recruitment discrimination 
experienced by the Black ethnic group in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 2017; 2018c).  
Another example of a private behaviour/decision is voting. Some international research has 
found that estimates of support for political candidates from list experiments better predict 
election results than estimates from traditional surveys or polls. Kalinin (2016) investigates 
the puzzling finding that the results of the 2012 Russian presidential election tend to match 
pre- and post-election polls quite closely, despite there being evidence of widespread 
electoral fraud. He shows that when masking of anti-incumbent opinions is accounted for, 
the polls no longer match the election result. 
Responding to openly and anonymously expressed attitudes 
Sociological approaches to studying discrimination highlight how the behaviour of 
individuals may be mediated by organisational practices or state policy (Reskin, 2003). 
Characteristics of organisations may constrain the biasing effects of either cognitive or 
attitudinal biases (Reskin, 2000). One important example of this is the use of formal, 
rationalised procedures in an organisation for recruitment and promotion. Formalisation 
reduces individual discretion, and the ability to act on either openly expressed or hidden 
bias, and this may be linked to increased representation of minorities in an organisation 
(Pager and Shepherd, 2008). While formalisation does not always reduce or eliminate 
discrimination, formal procedures could be associated with less discrimination: future 




19  It is not possible to directly investigate the link between anonymously-expressed attitudes elicited from list 
experiments and individual-level behaviours. This is because in order to provide complete and permanent 
anonymity, the masking of attitudes by any given individual in the experiment cannot be identified (see 
Section 5.3 for further discussion).  
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For developing interventions to change discriminatory attitudes, knowing people’s 
anonymously expressed preferences, not just what they openly express, may be 
informative. A different approach might be required to challenge and potentially modify 
beliefs that are held but not expressed. Has any given intervention, such as a public 
information campaign, led to a change in participants’ anonymously expressed preferences, 
or simply a change in socially desirable responding? Such a campaign might best be 
evaluated by assessing its effect on both explicit and hidden opinions. 
Perhaps the population is more similar in its attitudes than expected – these findings 
suggest that it is not so much that those with lower education are less tolerant of diversity, 
but rather those with higher education are better at masking their intolerance. This points 
to population-wide efforts to bring about attitudinal change, rather than targeting particular 
segments of the population. Overall this experiment is an attempt to stimulate a discussion 
of how to address negative attitudes using a more targeted, nuanced approach which 
acknowledges the role of social desirability bias. 
What are the lessons learned? The key point from a policy perspective is to be aware of how 
different types of attitudes are likely to be linked to discrimination in different arenas. As an 
example, while overtly expressed negativity may manifest itself as openly abusive behaviour 
in the workplace, negative anonymously expressed attitudes towards minority groups will 
more likely be associated with preferential treatment and refusals of promotion. Similarly, 
overtly expressed negativity could result in racial harassment on public transport, while 
negative covert attitudes could mean that minorities would be turned down for 
accommodation without ever finding out why. Any attempt to raise the quality of dialogue 
on human rights and equality in Ireland could be usefully informed by research on both 
overtly and anonymously expressed attitudes to minority groups. In terms of fostering 
interculturalism, while directly expressed opinions are important, efforts are also needed to 
combat more subtle, covert or coded forms of prejudice and discrimination.  
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APPENDIX 1  
Formally, the list experiment designed for this work consists of two steps. First, we subtract 
the mean response to the control list from the mean response to the treatment list to 
ascertain the anonymously expressed support for the additional focal item – Black or 
Muslim immigration. This is formalised in Equation 1 
 𝐸𝐸 = 𝑋𝑋�𝐵𝐵 − 𝑋𝑋�𝐴𝐴   (1) 
where E represents the proportion of the sample that select the focal item in the treatment 
list, which is derived from the difference between the mean response to the treatment list 
(𝑋𝑋�𝐵𝐵) and the mean response to the control list (𝑋𝑋�𝐴𝐴). A two-sample, one-sided t-test offers a 
formal test as to whether the proportion selecting the focal item in the treatment is 
significantly greater than zero. Although the difference between the two list questions 
provides a measure of anonymously expressed support for the focal item, the extent to 
which attitudes are hidden requires comparing the estimate of E to a direct question (D) 
about perception of either Black or Muslim people coming to Ireland. 
Responses to the direct question are either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and the interpretation is equivalent 
to a standard direct survey with no effort to mitigate social desirability bias. Capturing 
openly expressed support, the proportion who respond favourably to the direct question 
can be subtracted from the proportion derived from the list experiment (Equation 1). From 
this comparison a measure of the proportion of the population masking their negative 
attitudes emerges, which is formalised by Equation 2:  
 𝐶𝐶 = 𝐸𝐸 − 𝑋𝑋�𝐷𝐷   (2) 
where C measures the difference between the proportion expressing positive views towards 
Black or Muslim immigration when asked directly (i.e. 𝑋𝑋�𝐷𝐷, where the subscript D refers to 
mean response to the direct question (D), which is coded as a binary 0,1 response), and the 
proportion who express positive attitudes when assessed via the list experiment (i.e. E, 
which is calculated using Equation 1). When converted to a percentage scale, C is 
interpretable as the percentage-point difference between openly expressed tolerance and 
that which is expressed when permanent anonymity is offered. In sum, Equations 1 and 2 
provide three key measures: (1) tolerance expressed when asked directly, (2) tolerance 
62 | Hidden versus revealed attitudes 
when offered absolute anonymity and (3) the difference between the two, which measures 
the extent to which intolerance is masked.  
Of note, recent work has considered both multivariate approaches (Blair and Imai, 2012) 
and alternative approaches to accommodate direct and list measures in a single framework 
(Aronow et al., 2015). Future work might consider alternatives that include controls to 
better allow comparison between groups in a given experimental group via a multivariate 
approach, though this adds considerable complexity to the task. This report retains the 
original design of the list experiment, which entails a comparison of the means from the 
control and treatment list. Given that the treatment and control groups were randomly 
assigned, we have no reason to expect findings to differ considerably, if at all, from those 
reported here.  
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APPENDIX 2  
Here we present an overview of the four Economic Sentiment Monitor surveys from which 
data were taken for this report. These are the control and treatment surveys for June 2017, 
which probed attitudes towards Black immigration, and for July 2017, which asked about 
attitudes towards Muslim immigration. The key difference between the control and 
treatment surveys are the questions in Section C of each document. The focus is on the 
questions that formed part of the list experiment: other questions are summarised here for 
information.  
June 2017 (Black) Control  June 2017 (Black) Treatment  
Sex of respondent 
A1-A5: Questions on the respondent’s views on the state of the economy 
B1-B16: Questions on housing 
C3-C7: Questions on savings  
C21:  
The next questions are about your opinion on 
a few different issues in Ireland today.  
I am going to read out three things that you 
may or may not support.  
After I read all three, just tell me HOW MANY 
of them you support.  
I don’t want to know which statements, just 
HOW MANY. 
• Higher weekly State Pension 
• Lower tax on diesel 
• Bigger fines for litter 
 
How many of these would you support? 
None One Two Three (Don’t 
know) 
0 1 2 3 9 
C22: 
Would you support more Black people coming 
to live in Ireland? 
Yes …. 1 No..... 2 
C21: 
The next questions are about your opinion 
on a few different issues in Ireland today.  
I am going to read out four things that you 
may or may not support.  
After I read all four, just tell me HOW MANY 
of them you support.  
I don’t want to know which statements, just 
HOW MANY. 
• Higher weekly State Pension. 
• Lower tax on diesel 
• Bigger fines for litter 
• More Black people coming to live in 
Ireland 
  
How many of these would you support? 
None One Two Three Four  (Don’t 
know) 
0 1 2 3 4 9 
 
D0-D12: Background questions which include items on the following: age on respondent’s last 
birthday, nationality, highest level of formal education completed, financial stress. 
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July 2017 (Muslim) Control  July 2017 (Muslim) Treatment  
Sex of respondent 
A1-A5: Questions on the respondent’s views on the state of the economy 
B1-B16: Questions on housing 
C3-C7: Questions on savings  
C21:  
The next questions are about your opinion on 
a few different issues in Ireland today.  
I am going to read out three things that you 
may or may not support.  
After I read all three, just tell me HOW MANY 
of them you support.  
I don’t want to know which statements, just 
HOW MANY. 
  
• Higher weekly State Pension. 
• Lower tax on diesel 
• Bigger fines for litter 
 
 
How many of these would you support? 
 
None One Two Three (Don’t 
know) 
0 1 2 3 9 
 
C22: 
Would you support more Muslim people 
coming to live in Ireland? 
Yes …. 1 No ..... 2 
 
C21:  
The next questions are about your opinion 
on a few different issues in Ireland today.  
I am going to read out four things that you 
may or may not support.  
After I read all four, just tell me HOW MANY 
of them you support.  
I don’t want to know which statements, just 
HOW MANY. 
  
• Higher weekly State Pension. 
• Lower tax on diesel 
• Bigger fines for litter 
• More Muslim people coming to live in 
Ireland 
  
How many of these would you support? 
None One Two Three Four  (Don’t 
know) 
0 1 2 3 4 9 
 
D0-D12: Background questions which include items on the following: age on respondent’s last 
birthday, nationality, highest level of formal education completed, financial stress. 
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